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Capable Companies or Changing 
Markets?
Explaining the Export Performance of Firms 
in the Defence Industry 

1. Introduction 
A new literature on firm heterogeneity and international trade has in 
the last few years started to investigate the determinants of export at 
the firm-level. Theoretical models have challenged the conventional 
wisdom and investigated the reasons why only a small number of en-
terprises within each industry are able to export, whereas most others 
are not (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et alia, 2004). Empirical works in this 
new strand of international economics and business research have 
pointed out a set of key factors explaining firm heterogeneity and ex-
port performance within each industry, among which firm size and 
productivity (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Wagner, 2007), R&D and 
innovation (Roper and Love, 2002; Aw et alia, 2007; Damijan et alia, 
2010), and the ability of the firm to interact with external actors such 
as advanced users and the public science system (Alvarez et alia, 
2009; Laursen, 2009). 
 
Although this literature has led to a substantial leap forward in our un-
derstanding of firms’ internationalization strategies, the focus of this 
research has predominantly been to point out the general factors that 
may be important to investigate firm dynamics for all industries in the 
economy, but it has so far neglected the study of how industry-specific 
characteristics and sectoral specificities may shape and affect firm-
level patterns and dynamics.  
 
While rooted in this emerging strand of research, this paper extends it 
by focusing on one specific sector that has so far received only limited 
attention in the international economics, innovation and business liter-
ature: the defence industry. The defence sector is in many respects a 
peculiar market that differs substantially from many other industries 
of the economy. First, defence firms are very heterogenous and pro-
duce in several different industry segments (Markowski et alia, 2010). 
Secondly, they invest heavily in R&D and innovation, but the lag be-
tween input and output of the innovative process is often very long 
(Molas-Gallart, 1997; McLeish and Nightingale, 2007; Mowery, 
2010). Thirdly, the industry is heavily regulated and protected, and 
public instruments such as R&D procurement and offset agreements 
are commonly used to support national interests and domestic firms 
(Guay and Callum, 2002). 
 
What are the factors explaining the export performance of firms in the 
defence industry, and how do they differ from the general framework 
that is typically described in the firm heterogeneity and international 
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trade literature? The question motivating our paper is not only inter-
esting from an academic point of view, but it is also highly relevant 
for policy. In fact, a recent EU Directive (The European Union’s De-
fence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC) intends to 
provide a new framework for policy interventions in the European de-
fence market by limiting the extent of national protection, extending 
cooperation and cross-border trade within the EU and eventually in-
troducing a higher degree of market liberalization (Edwards, 2011). 
This EU Directive is starting to be implemented by national Member 
States in early 2012. The future scenario of openness and liberaliza-
tion does certainly represent an important change for firms in the de-
fence industry. This makes all the more relevant to study their current 
internationalization strategies, and investigate the major factors that 
may shape their competitive position in a more open European market 
in the future. 
 
Based on this research and policy background, our paper intends to 
carry out an empirical analysis of the determinants of the export per-
formance of firms in the defence industry in Norway. The Norwegian 
case is highly interesting. Norwegian defence companies have in the 
first decade of the new millennium seen their products become hugely 
popular abroad. Their export has on average quadrupled over the last 
ten years. Why is this the case – is this export success story explained 
mostly by firm-level characteristics and capabilities, as the existing 
research would suggest, or rather by external market conditions that 
have favoured the foreign commercialization of a selected number of 
Norwegian defence products?  
 
Our empirical analysis makes use of two complementary analyses. 
The first is based on quantitative firm-level data for the whole popula-
tion of defence companies in Norway, and limited to the recent period 
2006-2009. The second is based on qualitative case study research on 
the three most important defence export product types (weapon sta-
tions, ammunition, electronics), and how these have emerged histori-
cally and come to dominate the export markets in the last few years. 
The empirical results highlight the importance of four major success 
factors for Norwegian exporting firms: (1) the participation in offset 
agreements; (2) the ability to focus on their set of core competencies; 
(3) their R&D activities and interactions with the public S&T system; 
(4) demand opportunities and, relatedly, user-producer interactions. 
 
On the whole, the paper contributes to existing research in four main 
directions. First, from a theoretical point of view, this is the first study 
on firm heterogeneity and international trade focusing on the defence 
industry. Secondly, in empirical terms, our work presents new and 
unique firm-level data and evidence on innovation and export in the 
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defence sector (where data availability is usually very limited and 
firm-level information is highly protected and confidential). Thirdly, 
from a methodological point of view, our eclectic methodology com-
bines insights from quantitative and qualitative research, and shows 
how these may complement each other in empirical analyses of inno-
vation and enterprise performance. Finally, for policy, our empirical 
results provide information and indications that are useful to reflect 
upon how defence firms will respond to market liberalization when 
this will effectively be introduced in the defence market. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework and hypothesis; section 3 describes the methodology and 
data; section 4 discusses the results of the quantitative firm-level anal-
ysis; section 5 illustrates the results of the three case studies; and sec-
tion 6 summarizes the main findings and policy implications of the 
work. 
   
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
The international economics and international business literatures 
flourished in the last decade provide a solid set of ideas to investigate 
the export performance of enterprises. However, most of these export 
theories and the related empirical evidence are rather general referring 
to firm-level patterns and dynamics across the whole economy, and 
have not so far focused on specific sectors. The defence industry is a 
rather peculiar branch of the economy, e.g. due to the great involve-
ment of public authorities and their marked protection of national 
companies, the very high level of technological commitment and in-
novative investments, and the strong instability of demand and vulner-
ability to external shocks and changing political conditions.  
 
Our strategy to cope with these specificities of the defence branch is 
that, while our theoretical framework is firmly rooted in the most re-
cent strands of international economics and international business re-
search, we will explicitly point out some specific factors and argu-
ments that may be particularly important for analyzing the export per-
formance of defence firms. 
 
Firm size: Recent models in the literature on firm heterogeneity and 
international trade (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et alia, 2004) have in the 
last few years analyzed the firm-level determinants of enterprises’ ex-
port activities and pointed out the crucial importance of firm-specific 
characteristics such as size and productivity.1 Empirical tests of these 
models based on large firm-level datasets for selected countries have 
largely confirmed their main theoretical predictions (Bernard et alia, 
2007; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Wagner, 2007). In a nutshell, this 
literature points out that, within each industry, there is substantial het-
erogeneity, which is mostly accounted for by companies’ characteris-
tics such as size, productivity and capital intensity. Only a selected 
number of large firms (so-called superstar exporters) are able to over-
come the sunk export costs and trade barriers that are faced to sell 
their products in foreign markets, whereas smaller and less productive 
enterprises are typically not able to become exporters. Thus, according 
to this literature, the following hypothesis should hold within each in-
dustry:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Firm size is positively related to defence enterprises’ 
export intensity. 
                                                 
1  This theoretical literature is surveyed in Castellacci (2011a). 
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It is interesting to empirically analyze this standard proposition within 
the context of the defence industry. The defence branch is in fact not 
properly a sector in the common meaning of a “homogenous group of 
firms producing a closely related type of products”. Rather, it com-
prises firms belonging to different product and service categories, and 
it includes both large system integrators and scale-intensive producers 
(e.g. main battle tanks and fighter aircrafts) as well as smaller special-
ized suppliers of electronic components and software. In Norway, for 
instance, export activities are actively carried out both by large oli-
gopolistic enterprises and SMEs. Hence, the defence industry is char-
acterized by a firm size distribution that is less skewed than what is 
the case in most other sectors of the economy, and this may possibly 
imply that the above stated hypothesis does not hold within the con-
text of the defence branch. 
 
Technological innovation: A large number of empirical contributions 
rooted in the firm heterogeneity and international trade literature have 
in the last few years focused on technological innovation as a possible 
key factor contributing to explain enterprises’ export activities (Roper 
and Love, 2002; Barrios et alia, 2003; Lachenmaier and Wößman, 
2006; Aw et alia, 2007; Castellani and Zanfei, 2007; Damian et alia, 
2010; Ganotakis and Love, 2011). R&D and innovative investments 
are expected to enhance firms’ export performance for two main rea-
sons. On the one hand, they may lead to the introduction and commer-
cialization of new high quality products, thus increasing innovative 
firms’ shares in foreign markets. On the other hand, R&D activities 
may also lead to the creation of new processes that may in turn deter-
mine higher efficiency in the production process, lower sales prices 
and hence stronger international competitiveness dynamics. Accord-
ing to the existing literature, it is therefore reasonable to argue that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Defence firms with higher R&D intensity have on aver-
age a stronger export performance. 
 
Technological innovation is no doubt a crucial factor in the defence 
industry, which is characterized by both high private R&D invest-
ments and an active public innovation support through the procure-
ment of R&D projects and the related defence material (Lichtenberg, 
1995; Mowery, 2010). However, at the same time as formulating this 
second hypothesis, it is also important to point out two arguments that 
may blur this proposition and make it more difficult to analyze it in 
the defence industry than in other sectors of the economy (Castellacci, 
2011b). First, the innovative process for defence companies is typical-
ly characterized by very large R&D investments and a long time re-
quired for the innovative project to lead to a reliable and successful 
technological output. The long input-output lag may represent a prob-
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lem for empirical analyses of the defence market, since availability of 
firm-level data for this industry is in general quite limited and certain-
ly not satisfactory in terms of the (relatively short) time span that it is 
typically possible to consider. Secondly, a substantial share of military 
R&D investments is funded by public authorities through procurement 
contracts. If this policy strategy crowds out private R&D investments 
(David et alia, 2000), this public support may possibly turn out to 
lower the efficiency of R&D activities and hence moderate their ex-
pected positive impacts on export performance.   
 
Cooperation with the public science and technology (S&T) sys-
tem: Universities and public research organizations represent an im-
portant partner for cooperation for innovative firms (Pavitt, 1984; 
Mowery, 2005). Basic scientific advances produced by the public 
S&T system make it possible to increase the efficiency of the innova-
tive process by narrowing down the search landscape and focusing on 
the most productive and technically feasible approaches (Nelson, 
1982). Relatedly, by increasing the productivity and quality of new 
products and processes, advanced scientific knowledge made available 
to the firm is also likely to sustain its international competitiveness 
(Laursen and Salter, 2004; Castellacci, 2008).  
 
This general argument is expected to assume an even greater rele-
vance for companies in the defence industry, since many of these op-
erate in science-based fields where the contribution of scientific re-
search to technological developments is typically very important (e.g. 
electronics, ICTs, engineering, chemicals, material sciences).2 Further, 
the high public involvement and substantial funding efforts in this in-
dustry, motivated by national strategic and security reasons, is likely 
to make this type of public-private interactions even more relevant 
than it is the case in other sectors. Based on these arguments, we for-
mulate our third hypothesis for the empirical analysis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The public S&T is an important cooperation partner for 
exporting firms in the defence market. 
 
Advanced users in foreign markets: User-producer interactions rep-
resent another crucial factor explaining innovation dynamics and cor-
porate performance (Pavitt, 1984). Collaborations with advanced users 
tend in fact to increase the pool of technical knowledge available to 
innovating firms, while at the same time supporting mutual trust, 
knowledge sharing and hence lower transaction costs. According to 
the original formulation of the “home market hypothesis”, it is domes-
                                                 
2  An accurate overview and classification of the different technological fields covered by 
firms in the defence industry is provided by the taxonomy developed by the European De-
fence Agency (EDA). Fevolden et alia (2009) describe knowledge and technological 
competencies in the Norwegian defence industry in the light of the EDA taxonomy. 
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tic users that play a crucial role to raise the quality of the national 
markets, thus strengthening the competitiveness of firms in interna-
tional markets (Fagerberg, 1995; Alvarez et alia, 2009). However, an 
important recent extension of this argument points to advanced users 
in foreign markets as a key cooperation partner for exporting firms. In 
fact, exporting firms face substantial sunk costs and trade barriers 
when they try to sale their products overseas, e.g. due to lack of 
knowledge of the foreign market, the lack of a distribution network, or 
knowledge of the local regulatory framework. Cooperation agree-
ments with advanced users in foreign markets do therefore represent a 
crucial channel to overcome these trade barriers and achieve a com-
petitive position in overseas markets (Castellacci, 2010; Ganotakis 
and Love, 2011). This general argument is all the more relevant for 
firms in the defence industry. Defence companies must in fact satisfy 
highly demanding customers, given the strong precision, reliability 
and technological sophistication that are required for military prod-
ucts. Only active interactions between domestic firms and foreign ad-
vanced users makes cross-order military supply a feasible and attrac-
tive option. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Close cooperation with advanced users in foreign mar-
kets enhances defence enterprises’ export performance. 
 
Focus on core competencies: The core competence of an enterprise is 
a specific set of abilities or qualities that gives the firm a unique ad-
vantage and position vis-à-vis its market rivals (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990). It may refer to a set of technical knowledge and skills or some 
other capability or strategic characteristic of the company. It is core 
capabilities that make it possible for the enterprise to strive in highly 
competitive markets. Focusing on its set of core competencies, rather 
than spreading resources on a broader range of areas and product port-
folio, does therefore represent an important factor for a firm to achieve 
a strong competitive position in international markets. According to 
this argument, then, the depth of the knowledge search process may be 
more relevant than its breadth (Laursen and Salter, 2004) in order to 
sustain the export intensity of an enterprise. In other words, large mul-
ti-product firms characterized by a broad spectrum of competencies in 
several knowledge areas are likely to achieve a high level of total ex-
ports; by contrast, however, smaller producers specialized in a more 
narrow set of key core competencies and products may be in a better 
position to obtain greater export intensity. Since our empirical analysis 
will focus on firms in the Norwegian defence sector, this argument 
may be particularly important, given that the relative small size of the 
Norwegian market makes it necessary for defence companies to 
achieve a high degree of specialization in a restricted set of areas 
Capable Companies or Changing Markets?   13 
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where they may have core competitive advantages vis-à-vis their for-
eign rivals.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Defence firms that specialize on their core competen-
cies are likely to have greater export intensity than enterprises char-
acterized by a broader competence and product portfolio.   
 
Offset agreements: Public authorities regulating the defence industry 
have for a long time made use of offset agreements as a policy strate-
gy aiming at both, the protection of national security interests and the 
promotion of defence firms’ competitiveness (Martin, 1996; Markow-
ski et alia, 2010). Although there exists a wide range of practices and 
a complex array of different offset regulations, the main rationale of 
this type of public intervention can be summarized (and largely sim-
plified) as follows. When country X imports a certain amount of de-
fence material from a firm of country Y, national authorities of coun-
try X may stipulate an offset agreement according to which the firm in 
country Y is required to purchase a corresponding amount of defence 
products (or a fraction of it) from a firm in country X. Intuitively, this 
policy scheme introduces an important support channel for defence 
firms, as their export contracts is not only stipulated on the basis of the 
price, quality or technological content of their products, but it also re-
lies on this industrial policy practice. A related argument is that, once 
domestic firms are able to penetrate foreign market due to the exist-
ence of offset agreements, their presence overseas may also act as a 
channel to build up and develop their own production and distribution 
network abroad and overcome some of the related trade barriers in the 
future. Therefore, offset agreements may in principle have long-
lasting and sizeable effects on firms’ export performance. 
  
Hypothesis 6: Offset agreements represent an important factor sup-
porting defence firms’ sales in foreign markets. 
 
Demand opportunities: Demand conditions represent a fundamental 
factor shaping economic opportunities in international markets. While 
the demand for older and standardized products is closely dependent 
on their sales prices and the country’s terms of trade, the commerciali-
zation of new varieties and technologically advanced products in in-
ternational markets is instead more dependent on the existence of dy-
namic demand conditions and favourable market opportunities, at 
least in the early phase of overseas commercialization (Malerba, 2005; 
Von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005). However, demand opportunities 
are quite difficult to account for and predict in advance for firms in the 
defence industry. This is in fact typically characterized by fluctuating 
demand conditions, which are often dependent on one or few big pub-
lic customers, and which may be affected by political changes or ex-
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ternal shocks (e.g. peace and conflicts; see Guay and Callum, 2002). 
Our seventh hypothesis points to the important and erratic role of de-
mand opportunities in this market.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Demand opportunities may change in the defence in-
dustry as a response to external shocks, and this is likely to have an 
important impact on the export performance of firms. 
 
 
3. Methods and data 
An appropriate methodology to carry out an empirical investigation of 
the determinants of firms’ export performance in the defence industry 
must take into due account some of the key characteristics of the na-
tional market upon which the investigation focuses. The Norwegian 
defence sector is relatively small, with a population of approximately 
100 firms. Many of these enterprises are SMEs, and a small number of 
large oligopolistic producers dominate both the domestic and the ex-
port markets. Further, as described in more details below, the export 
market is highly concentrated on a few key products that account for 
the bulk of Norwegian firms’ foreign sales. 
 
For our empirical analysis, these characteristics of the Norwegian de-
fence industry call for an eclectic methodology combining both quan-
titative and qualitative methods. On the one hand, quantitative analy-
sis and statistical evidence enable to point out the main stylized facts 
and regularities that hold for the whole population of defence firms in 
Norway. However, due to the relatively small size of this population 
and the strong concentration of production and export in the hand of a 
limited number of large oligopolistic firms, it is also important to 
complement quantitative evidence with qualitative case study re-
search. The latter leads to a better understanding and more in-depth 
insights of the determinants of export performance in this market pre-
cisely by focusing on the few key large companies and successful 
products that have recently driven the dynamics of this sector. 
 
This is the eclectic approach that we have adopted in our empirical 
investigation. The empirical analysis is divided in two interrelated 
parts. The results of the first part (section 4) are based on quantitative 
firm-level data and statistical analysis (multivariate regressions) fo-
cusing on the recent period 2006-2009, while the second part (section 
5) is based on qualitative case study research focusing on a few key 
large firms and crucial products that dominate the Norwegian export 
market, and how these have emerged and evolved in the last decades. 
This case study research is based on in-depth interviews realized dur-
ing the year 2010 with the most important Norwegian defence export-
ers. 
 
The quantitative analysis (see next section) makes use of a new firm-
level dataset that comprises rich and detailed information on the whole 
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population of companies in the defence industry in Norway.3 This da-
tabase, recently produced by the Norwegian Defence Research Estab-
lishment (FFI, see Fevolden et alia, 2009), is based on two different 
data sources. The first is firm-level account data, providing infor-
mation on some of the main characteristics of the whole population of 
100 defence firms, such as firm size, revenues, export and R&D ex-
penditures. This is cross-sectional data referring to the year 2009.  
 
The second is survey data obtained from the VIFIN Survey (“Ver-
diskaping i forsvarsindustrien”). This survey data collection work was 
carried out by FFI during the year 2008. The VIFIN questionnaire 
asked defence enterprises a large number of questions (more than 50 
items) about their main characteristics, strategies, R&D and innova-
tion activities, interactions with external actors in the domestic and 
foreign markets, and internationalization strategies. These questions 
and the related indicators refer to the year 2006. The survey addressed 
the whole population of Norwegian defence firms, and obtained a total 
number of 45 respondent firms (response rate: 45%). 
 
By matching these two data sources, we have obtained a combined 
firm-level dataset providing complete information on these 45 defence 
firms, which represents the sample we use in our statistical analysis. 
Although this is a relatively small number of observations for a re-
gression analysis, it is important to emphasize that the companies in 
our sample account for more than 85% of the total export of defence 
material in Norway. This means that our data sample, despite its rela-
tively small size, is highly representative of the whole population of 
Norwegian defence firms and their export performance. 
 
Our statistical analysis (see next section) makes use of the following 
firm-level variables and indicators, whose descriptive patterns are re-
ported in table 1.  
 
Total export intensity: Total export divided by the total revenue of 
the firm (year 2009). This indicator will be used as the first dependent 
variable in our regression model. Table 1 shows that, on average, the 
total export intensity is above 31%. 
 
Defence export intensity: Export of defence material divided by the 
total defence-related revenue of the firm (year 2009). Differently from 
the previous indicator, this only focuses on defence-related sales and 
excludes all other products of civilian use (thus avoiding the well 
know problem of dual use measurement bias). This indicator will be 
used as the second dependent variable in our regression model, and it 
                                                 
3  This population is defined as all the firms belonging to the Norwegian Defence and Secu-
rity Industries Association (FSi; www.fsi.no). 
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will be the key variable of interest in our analysis. The defence export 
intensity (industry-level average) is around 27%. 
 
The explanatory variables in our model will be measured through the 
following six indicators.4 
 
Firm size: Number of employees of the firm in the year 2006. The 
industry average is around 200, although there is a substantial varia-
bility in the sample that comprises both many SMEs as well as large 
enterprises. 
 
R&D intensity: Total R&D divided by the firm’s total revenues (year 
2006). The figures for total R&D include both the firm’s own R&D 
costs and its publicly funded R&D activities. On average, more than 
50% of the companies in the sample have R&D activities, whereas the 
mean for all other industries in the Norwegian economy is around 
12%. This indicates that the defence industry is characterized by a 
much higher R&D propensity than other sectors as well as a much 
higher amount of (private and public) resources devoted to innovative 
activities. 
 
Cooperation with the public R&D system: The VIFIN questionnaire 
asked Norwegian defence firms whether “public R&D organizations 
and institutions are important actors for cooperation for developing 
new products”. The variable is categorical and takes four values, rang-
ing from 4 (“very important”) to 1 (“not important”).  
 
Advanced users in foreign markets:  The enterprises participating in 
the VIFIN survey were also asked whether they regard “advanced for-
eign users in the export market an important cooperation partner for 
their production activities”. The categorical variable ranges from 4 
(“very important”) to 1 (“not important”).  
 
Focus on core competencies: This indicator refers to the VIFIN sur-
vey question asking the enterprises whether they consider “focusing 
on core competencies and outsourcing other secondary activities” an 
important strategy to improve their performance. Similarly to the pre-
vious, the variable takes four values on a scale between 4 (“very im-
portant”) and 1 (“not important”).  
 
Offset agreements: This is a dummy variable obtained from the ques-
tion asking whether the firms have taken part in offset agreements. On 
                                                 
4  Our firm-level dataset does not contain any information about demand opportunities 
and/or demand shocks, which is the seventh explanatory factor highlighted in the model 
presented in the previous section (see hypothesis 7). Thus, our quantitative analysis is 
forced to disregard this variable, although this factor will be closely scrutinized in the 
qualitative analysis presented in section 5. 
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average, 60% of the companies in the sample have previously had off-
set agreements regulating their sales overseas.5 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Total export intensity 
 
34 0.31 0.33 0 1 
 
Defence export intensity 
 
33 0.27 0.39 0 1 
 
Firm size (number of employees) 
 
41 200.6 425.8 2 2009 
 
R&D intensity 
 
33 10.05 15.13 0 53.97 
 
Cooperation with the public science system 
 
44 2.11 1.06 1 4 
 
Advanced users in foreign markets 
 
43 2.79 1.03 1 4 
 
Focus on core competencies 
 
44 2.57 0.97 1 4 
 
Offset agreements 
 
43 0.60 0.49 0 1 
 
                                                 
5  In addition to the six main explanatory variables noted here, we have also made use of 
two more indicators as instrumental variables in some of the regressions (as further ex-
plained in section 4): (1) Cooperation with foreign competitors: VIFIN survey question 
on whether the firms regard “foreign competitors an important cooperation partner for 
their production activities”. (2) Internationalization strategy: VIFIN survey question on 
whether the firms regard “their internationalization strategy an important channel to in-
crease their profitability and market performance”. Both variables are measured on a scale 
between 4 (“very important”) and 1 (“not important”).  
4. Empirical results I:  
Firm-level quantitative analysis 
The regression model presented in this section analyzes the determi-
nants of Norwegian defence firms’ export performance. The variable 
we seek to explain is the export intensity of firms. Specifically, we 
consider two dependent variables: the total export intensity of firms 
(including both the export of defence and civilian material), and the 
defence export intensity (which only refers to defence sales). The lat-
ter variable is the one of main interest for this study, although we con-
sider it interesting to present the results also for the total export inten-
sity variable. The explanatory factors are those pointed out in our the-
oretical model, and they are measured through the six indicators de-
fined in the previous section. 
 
The regression analysis makes use of five estimation methods: (1) 
OLS, which we use as a benchmark; (2) tobit, a censored regression 
model that takes into account the lower and upper limits of the export 
intensity variable; (3) median regression (i.e. a quantile regression 
centered at the 50th percentile of the export intensity distribution), 
which is less dependent on the presence of outliers than the previous 
two methods; (4) 2SLS, where we consider the possible endogeneity 
of the regressor “advanced users in foreign markets” by means of in-
strumental variables; (5) IV tobit, which does also deal with the same 
endogeneity issue in a tobit framework.  
 
An econometric issue in this regression model is due to the possible 
multicollinearity of two of the explanatory variables: R&D intensity 
and cooperation with the public S&T system. Table 2 shows the corre-
lation matrix. Among the explanatory factors, the highest correlation 
coefficient is in fact the one between the R&D and the public coopera-
tion variables (+0,49). In a relatively small sample as the one under 
investigation here, the correlation between these two indicators is like-
ly to result in a multicollinearity issue and hence a low precision of 
some of the estimated coefficients. To consider this problem, we have 
run separate regressions excluding the public cooperation variable, in 
order to see whether the results are affected by the inclusion or exclu-
sion of this indicator. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
Total export 
intensity 
 
Defence export 
intensity 
 
Firm size 
(number of 
employees) 
 
Focus on core 
competencies 
 
Advanced users 
in foreign  
markets 
 
Cooperation 
with the public 
science system 
 
Offset 
agreements 
 
R&D 
intensity 
 
Total export intensity 
 
1 
       
 
Defence export intensity 
 
0.73 
 
1 
      
 
Firm size (number of employees) 
 
0.44 
 
0.09 
 
1 
     
 
Focus on core competencies 
 
0.40 
 
0.57 
 
0.15 
 
1 
    
 
Advanced users in foreign markets 
 
0.44 
 
0.52 
 
0.12 
 
0.08 
 
1 
   
 
Cooperation with the public science system 
 
0.55 
 
0.44 
 
0.29 
 
0.07 
 
0.32 
 
1 
  
 
Offset agreements 
 
0.22 
 
0.28 
 
0.31 
 
0.13 
 
0.04 
 
0.00 
 
1 
 
 
R&D intensity 
 
0.02 0.02 -0.14 -0.14 0.23 0.49 -0.26 1 
 
 
The estimation results are presented in table 3 (total export intensity) 
and table 4 (defence export intensity). As noted above, table 4 is the 
one of main interest for this study, but the comparison with the results 
in table 3 is interesting and informative. The first explanatory variable 
included in the model is firm size (number of employees). Table 3 in-
dicates the existence of a positive correlation between firm size and 
total export intensity, although the magnitude of the estimated coeffi-
cient is quite low (see columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10). However, when we 
shift the focus to the defence export intensity (table 4), the expected 
relationship between size and export performance does not turn out to 
be significant (see columns 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20).6 This contrasts 
with the standard hypothesis formulated on the basis of the firm heter-
ogeneity and international trade literature (see hypothesis 1, section 2). 
One possible reason explaining the lack of precision of this relation-
ship is that, in our sample, the firms with the highest defence export 
intensity are not only the largest and most important enterprises domi-
nating the Norwegian defence market (Kongsberg, Nammo, Thales 
Norway) but do also include several SMEs that have recently achieved 
a defence export intensity higher than 40%.  As further discussed in 
the next section, some of these small-size Norwegian defence firms 
have been able to develop core competencies and technological capa-
bilities and thus act as specialized suppliers of larger domestic and in-
ternational producers within, among others, segments of the ICT and 
electronics industries (see the case study in section 5.3). 
 
The next variable presented in tables 3 and 4 is the R&D intensity. In 
all of the regressions presented in the two tables, the R&D variable 
turns out to be not significant. Thus, differently from the standard hy-
pothesis formulated according to the literature (hypothesis 2), our em-
pirical results fail to identify a positive significant relationship be-
tween R&D and export intensity. Our data does in fact indicate that 
there is substantial heterogeneity in our firm-level sample, with some 
of the top exporters characterized by very high R&D intensity whereas 
some others by substantially lower innovative investments. This em-
pirical result (or lack of such) is important and will be discussed fur-
ther in the case study analysis presented in the next section. A more 
specific but important caveat, though, is that the regression analysis 
presented here refers to the relatively short time span 2006-2009. This 
may be too short a period to enable a proper measurement of the links 
between input and output of the innovative process, which in the de-
fence industry is typically characterized by long R&D projects and 
                                                 
6  Following the suggestion of one of our discussants, we have carried out two additional 
exercises to analyze the statistical relationship between firm size and export intensity in 
our sample. First, we have included in the regressions the size variable in quadratic form, 
investigating the possibility of a U-shaped relationship. Secondly, in order to see whether 
the largest firms (system integrators) behave differently from all others SMEs in our sam-
ple, we have created a “system integrator” dummy variable and interacted it with the size 
indicator. Neither of these two exercises produced significant results. 
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protracted periods of market commercialization. The qualitative anal-
ysis presented in the next section will shed further light on this aspect 
by taking a longer term perspective on the historical developments of 
some of the key technologies and successful export products intro-
duced by Norwegian firms. 
 
The variable measuring the interactions between defence firms and the 
public R&D system turns out, as expected, to be positively related to 
both total export intensity and export intensity of defence material 
(hypothesis 3). The size of the coefficient is higher (and more signifi-
cant) for the latter, indicating that the public R&D system is a particu-
larly important cooperation actor for the development and foreign 
commercialization of new defence-related products.  
 
The indicator measuring the importance of advanced users in foreign 
markets is also positively related to both total export intensity and ex-
port intensity of defence material (hypothesis 4). The magnitude of the 
coefficient is much higher for the defence export intensity, suggesting 
again that interacting with advanced foreign users is an important fac-
tor supporting the export of defence material, since it increases the 
trust and knowledge exchanges between producers and users, and it 
enables exporting firms to open up and strengthen their distribution 
network in foreign markets. It is also interesting to note that the size of 
this estimated coefficient is higher (and still significant) when the var-
iable is treated as endogenous (see regressions 7 to 10 in table 3, and 
17 to 20 in table 4). 
 
Next, the variable measuring the focus on core competencies does also 
perform in line with the theoretical discussion presented in section 2. 
Firms that are able to focus on their core competencies and outsource 
other secondary activities have on average a higher export intensity 
(hypothesis 5). Interestingly, the size of the estimated coefficient is 
substantially higher (almost double) for the defence export intensity 
dependent variable, indicating that the ability to focus on the firm’s set 
of core competencies – rather than broadening up the technological 
and product portfolio – is a particularly relevant factor supporting the 
export of defence material. 
 
The bottom part of tables 3 and 4 present the results for the offset 
agreements dummy variable. The dummy does not turn out to be a 
significant explanatory factor for the total export intensity (table 3), 
but the estimated coefficient gets the expected sign and statistical pre-
cision when we focus on the defence export intensity dependent varia-
ble in table 4. This confirms the important role of public procurement 
and offset agreements for the export of defence products (hypothesis 
6). It would have of course been better to employ a more precise quan-
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titative indicator of offset agreements instead of a simple dummy vari-
able. However, more detailed data on offset contracts are confidential 
and typically not available at the firm level, so that the dummy varia-
ble used here does indeed provide interesting (although limited) evi-
dence of their relevance for firms’ international activities. 
Table 3: Regression results: The determinants of total export intensity  
 
 
 
     OLS 
 
   Tobit   Median  regression       2SLS      IV Tobit  
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Firm size (number of employees) 
 
0.0002 
(1.54) 
0.0002 
(2.18)** 
0.0002 
(1.62) 
0.0002 
(2.38)*
* 
0.0002 
(1.72)* 
0.0002 
(2.82)*** 
0.0002 
(1.47) 
0.0002 
(1.89)* 
0.002 
(1.67)* 
0.0002 
(1.91)* 
 
R&D intensity 
 
-0.0026 
(0.49) 
0.0025 
(0.51) 
-0.0033 
(0.74) 
0.0024 
(0.52) 
-0.0009 
(0.20) 
0.0002 
(0.07) 
-0.003 
(0.52) 
0.0007 
(0.14) 
0.0005 
(0.07) 
0.0016 
(0.28) 
 
Cooperation with the public science system 
 
0.132 
(2.02)** 
 
0.149 
(2.50)**
* 
 
0.105 
(1.58) 
 
0.108 
(1.49) 
 
0.033 
(0.37) 
 
 
Advanced users in foreign markets 
 
0.078 
(1.30) 
0.112 
(1.81)* 
0.076 
(1.42) 
0.113 
(2.02)* 
0.069 
(1.26) 
0.157 
(2.73)*** 
0.160 
(1.68)* 
0.220 
(2.25)** 
0.244 
(2.17)** 
0.263 
(2.51)** 
 
Focus on core competencies 
 
0.119 
(2.16)** 
0.125 
(2.13)** 
0.126 
(2.56)**
* 
0.131 
(2.43)*
* 
0.105 
(1.96)* 
0.122 
(2.15)** 
0.116 
(1.96)* 
0.119 
(1.84)* 
0.109 
(1.66)* 
0.109 
(1.63) 
 
Offset agreements 
 
0.018 
(0.15) 
0.029 
(0.23) 
0.022 
(0.21) 
0.034 
(0.29) 
0.140 
(1.30) 
0.161 
(1.33) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
0.011 
(0.08) 
0.061 
(0.41) 
0.062 
(0.41) 
 
Constant 
 
-0.501 
(2.27)** 
-0.407 
(1.77)* 
-0.537 
(2.71)**
* 
-0.424 
(2.01)* 
-0.491 
(2.83)*** 
-0.570 
(2.48)** 
-0.651 
(2.32)** 
-0.647 
(2.11)** 
-0.826 
(2.48)** 
-0.827 
(2.43)* 
 
R
2 
(or pseudo R
2
) 
 
0.525 0.433 0.887 0.645 0.418 0.367 0.466 0.332 - - 
 
Significance levels: 
***
 1%; 
**
 5%; 
*
 10%. Regressions (7) to (10): Endogenous variable: Advanced users in foreign markets; Instrumental variables: (1) Cooper-
ation with foreign competitors; (2) Internationalization strategy. 
Table 4: Regression results: The determinants of defence export intensity  
 
 
 
      OLS 
 
    Tobit    Median    regression       2SLS       IV Tobit  
 
 
(11) 
 
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
Firm size (number of employees) 
 
-0.0002 
(1.95)* 
-0.0001 
(0.75) 
-0.0002 
(2.44)** 
-0.0001 
(0.99) 
-0.0002 
(2.31)** 
-0.0001 
(0.54) 
-0.0002 
(1.91)* 
-0.0001 
(0.81) 
-0.0002 
(1.63) 
-0.0001 
(0.70) 
 
R&D intensity 
 
-0.0063 
(1.33) 
0.0011 
(0.24) 
-0.0073 
(1.65) 
0.0016 
(0.35) 
-0.0054 
(1.13) 
0.0005 
(0.14) 
-0.0062 
(1.27) 
0.0002 
(0.04) 
-0.0089 
(1.09) 
-0.0000 
(0.00) 
 
Cooperation with the public science system 
 
0.174 
(3.00)*** 
 
0.197 
(3.51)*** 
 
0.106 
(1.89)* 
 
0.175 
(2.92)*** 
 
0.237 
(2.23)** 
 
 
Advanced users in foreign markets 
 
0.173 
(3.27)*** 
0.202 
(3.31)*** 
0.181 
(3.79)*** 
0.217 
(3.76)**
* 
0.198 
(3.83)*** 
0.231 
(3.76)*** 
0.181 
(2.37)** 
0.269 
(2.92)*** 
0.266 
(2.08)** 
0.441 
(3.03)*** 
 
Focus on core competencies 
 
0.196 
(4.10)*** 
0.211 
(3.78)*** 
0.212 
(4.85)*** 
0.229 
(4.32)**
* 
0.262 
(5.01)*** 
0.253 
(4.25)*** 
0.193 
(3.91)*** 
0.202 
(3.41)*** 
0.282 
(3.44)*** 
0.276 
(2.90)*** 
 
Offset agreements 
 
0.188 
(1.84)* 
0.192 
(1.60) 
0.209 
(2.26)** 
0.217 
(1.92)* 
0.126 
(1.03) 
0.045 
(0.34) 
0.201 
(1.85)* 
0.202 
(1.54) 
0.322 
(1.85)* 
0.370 
(1.75)* 
 
Constant 
 
-1.019 
(5.38)*** 
-0.883 
(4.09)*** 
-1.115 
(6.26)*** 
-0.971 
(4.65)**
* 
-1.087 
(5.34)*** 
-0.990 
(4.31)*** 
-1.048 
(4.61)*** 
-1-033 
(3.77)*** 
-1.804 
(4.20)*** 
-1.953 
(3.73)*** 
 
R
2 
(or pseudo R
2
) 
 
0.731 0.609 1.130 0.802 0.524 0.420 0.727 0.583 - - 
 
Significance levels: 
***
 1%; 
**
 5%; 
*
 10%. Regressions (17) to (20): Endogenous variable: Advanced users in foreign markets; Instrumental variables: (1) Coop-
eration with foreign competitors; (2) Internationalization strategy. 
 
 
5. Empirical results II:  
Product-based qualitative analysis 
While the quantitative analysis of firm-level data points out the most 
important factors explaining the export performance of Norwegian 
defence firms, the regression results are not able to shed further light 
on one key relevant issue. The export success recently achieved by 
Norwegian defence companies is to some extent the result of a spike 
in demand for a small group of products produced by a limited num-
ber of companies. Few places is this more clearly illustrated than in 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s statistics on export of 
defence material. As shown in table 5, of the 20 items that the Minis-
try uses to classify the Norwegian export, three account for over 80 % 
of the defence export in 2009 and were responsible for most of the 
growth in the last decade. These three items are (1) fire control, 
search, handling and counter-measure equipment, (2) ammunition and 
explosives, and (3) electronic equipment. If these items are combined 
with generally available information about the Norwegian defence in-
dustry, they can be further narrowed down to the following three more 
specific products and producers: (1) weapon stations produced by 
Kongsberg, (2) large and medium caliber ammunition by Nammo, and 
(3) electronic equipment, i.e. an assortment of sensor and communica-
tions equipment produced by Kongsberg and a group of small and 
medium-sized defence contractors, such as Thales Norway and Sim-
rad Optronics. This section will focus on these three key Norwegian 
products. The case study research will take a long-run perspective on 
the historical emergence and later development of these products, 
point out some of their technological characteristics, focus on the 
firms that produced and commercialized them, and discuss the main 
reasons explaining the export success in each of these cases. This 
qualitative product-based analysis is expected to complement and re-
fine the results of the quantitative data analysis. 
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Table 5: Total Norwegian export in the defence industry, 2000-
2009. 
 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
Item Description
1 Hand weapons for military or other purposes 184 510 000 146 089 400 60 660 000 24 488 000 25 540 000 11 436 000 13 134 000 3 446 000 526 000 5 042 000
2 Artillery etc. 20 743 000 2 217 000 10 918 000 13 866 000 23 136 000 174 045 000 436 461 000 12 976 000 8 230 000 510 000
3 Missile systems bombs, rockets, torpedoes, mines and hand granades130 254 000 86 249 000 165 334 000 156 070 000 55 779 000 98 710 000 613 356 000 266 283 000 33 382 000 77 865 000
4 Fire control, search, handling and counter-measure equipment1 995 253 000 1 859 808 000 1 187 150 000 878 628 000 803 017 000 372 141 000 639 090 000 119 216 000 47 569 000 4 149 000
5 ABC-weapons etc 737 000 199 000 1 040 000 0 611 000 837 000 663 000 0 0 0
6 Ammunition, explosives, etc 807 014 000 563 931 406 546 534 000 671 676 430 564 642 000 310 410 640 387 152 000 304 236 000 268 669 000 258 448 000
7 Electronic equipment, etc., not included in item 4 917 359 000 804 150 000 712 513 600 476 292 000 578 678 000 534 955 016 361 518 000 177 544 000 384 295 000 374 072 000
8 Vessels and under water equipment 15 679 000 13 924 000 4 466 000 96 937 000 72 685 000 47 017 000 34 371 000 0 0 0
9 Aerial vehicles etc. 167 170 000 76 620 000 198 944 000 207 653 000 200 707 000 271 194 000 320 549 000 0 0 0
10 Tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles constructed for military purposes 6 191 000 87 209 000 29 455 000 83 427 000 34 633 000 90 115 000 83 180 000 40 000 11 476 000 0
11 Protection and rescue equipment designed for military purposes5 776 000 3 234 670 3 877 000 0 0 38 000 0 0 0 0
12 Hangars, containers and tents developed for military purposes 0 0 100 000 9 252 000 10 343 000 0 0 0 0 0
13 Camouflage equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 Photo materiel 0 0 0 0 0 362 000 0 0 0 0
15 Quartermaster supplies: clothes, fuel, office equipment etc. developed for military purposes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 Simulators specially constructed or modified for training on the use of material mention in 1-15 above.152 254 000 203 555 000 212 345 000 43 657 000 10 344 000 3 458 000 43 186 000 820 000 50 799 000 7 920 000
18 Software 27 809 000 15 429 000 40 267 000 8 520 000 22 061 000 85 600 000 12 975 000 7 452 000 25 289 000 4 400 000
19 Materials, machines and tools etc. 51 436 000 5 903 000 17 710 000 234 063 000 14 520 000 3 631 000 33 023 000 16 228 000 15 994 000 9 596 000
20 Technologies connected to equipment mention under 1-19 above.7 152 000 5 153 000 639 000 5 615 000 7 055 000 1 526 000 38 734 000 0 3 287 000 12 000
(17) (Parts) 1 387 742 000 753 164 000 319 154 000
Total 4 499 337 000 3 873 671 476 3 191 952 600 2 910 144 430 2 423 751 000 2 005 475 656 3 017 392 000 2 295 983 000 1 602 680 000 1 061 168 000  
 
Source: statistics from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
5.1 Weapon stations 
Remotely-controlled weapon stations (RWS) are systems that allow an 
operator to control a turret-mounted weapon system from inside a ve-
hicle or a vessel. A typical configuration of such a system is lightly 
armored vehicle like a Stryker with a heavy machine gun mounted on 
top of the roof. Although the most frequently stated purpose of em-
ploying a weapon station is to move the gunner from a vulnerable po-
sition on top of the vehicle to a protected position inside, the weapon 
station can also be equipped with sophisticated sensors that have the 
added benefit of improving the gunner’s firing accuracy and enabling 
the crew inside to get a more detailed and comprehensive view of the 
outside battlefield. 
 
The Norwegian engagement with remotely-controlled weapon stations 
can be traced back at least to the early 1990s (Andås, 2006). In the 
early 1990s, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), a 
public research organization, initiated a project to develop the first 
Norwegian remotely-controlled weapon station. Nevertheless, the re-
searchers at FFI did not intend for this weapon station to provide the 
armed forces with offensive capabilities. Rather, they developed the 
weapon station to serve as an explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) sys-
tem. The researchers at FFI envisioned that if the Norwegian airports 
were attacked, Norway would need a unit to clear the runways of un-
exploded bombs so that the airfields could be swiftly rebuilt, and they 
believed that a remotely-controlled weapon station would be ideal to 
set off these unexploded bombs without endangering the personnel. 
To aid them, FFI engaged the private defence contractor, Vinghøeg, 
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which helped them develop and produce the first versions of this EOD 
system, a system that would later be adopted by the Norwegian armed 
forces – under the designation Advanced Multi Role Weapon Station 
(AMRWS) – and deployed, among others, in Kosovo and Afghani-
stan.  
 
Although the initial idea was to use the weapon station for explosive 
ordinance disposal, Vinghøeg soon realized that the same system 
could have a broader commercial potential as a more offensive system 
(Dagsavisen, 2011). Nevertheless, to realize this ambition, Vinghøeg 
needed access to both large-scale production facilities and a consider-
able marketing apparatus. Since Vinghøeg was a medium-sized de-
fence contractor, it felt it had to solicit help from a larger company 
and chose to ask Kongsberg –the largest Norwegian defence company 
– to join them in an effort to industrialize this new type of weapon sta-
tion. Kongsberg accepted Vinghøeg’s invitation and together they had 
by the end of the 1990s developed a working prototype weapon sta-
tion, which could be mounted on most military vehicles and control a 
small to medium caliber weapon. In the process, Kongsberg also 
bought the rights from Vinghøeg and became the prime contractor for 
the Norwegian weapon station that would later be marketed under the 
name “Protector”.  
 
In the same time span, there were other developments, across the At-
lantic, that serve to explain why Kongsberg’s weapon station become 
such an commercial success – developments that were closely linked 
to ideas about military transformation and counter insurgency. After 
the cold war ended, the US no longer faced a threat from an opposing 
super power and was, as many of its allies, struggling with a military 
force that seemed ill equipped to tackle its new security related chal-
lenges. As part of the ensuing debate a concept of military transfor-
mation emerged. Although military transformation has, by some au-
thors, been described as one of the more ambiguous and ill-defined 
concepts in military terminology, some ideas that would be important 
to Kongsberg’s success have been proposed under this banner: the 
need for forces that combined a long reach and short response time 
with adequate protection and lethality. One of the lessons that the US 
drew from the conflicts it was engaged in during the 1990s was that its 
armed forces was either too heavy and immobile as the armored regi-
ments sent to the Persian Gulf, which took six months to deploy, or 
too light and vulnerable as the infantry forces that were deployed in 
Mogadishu, Somalia, which suffered the loss of several soldiers’ life 
(US General Accounting Office, 2002). 
 
To remedy this situation, the US Army started as early as 1999 to de-
velop what would later be called “interim brigade combat teams,” a 
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new type of forces that supposedly “could more rapidly deploy and 
effectively operate in all types of military operations”. As part of the 
development of these “new type of forces”, the Army awarded, in 
2000, General Dynamics a contract for the production of an “Interim 
Armored Vehicle”, which would later receive the name Stryker.7 The 
Stryker armored fighting vehicle provided an unforeseen and excep-
tional opportunity for Kongsberg. It consisted of a family of ten dif-
ferent vehicle variants, and General Dynamics decided to attach a 
Kongsberg made weapon station on six of them (Gourley, 2006). Why 
General Dynamics chose Kongsberg’s weapon stations instead of one 
of its competitors is still debated: one part of the explanation is cer-
tainly that Kongsberg had a very capable weapon station and another 
part is that General Dynamics used the opportunity to fulfill some off-
set obligations that it had to Norway.  
 
Another part of the story of the weapon station’s success started short-
ly afterwards, when two aircrafts crashed into the World Trade center. 
In response to these terrorist attacks and as part of a changed political 
climate, the US chose to engage in two wars in close succession – one 
in Afghanistan in 2001 and another in Iraq in 2003. Although the US 
and its allies won the conventional part of these wars fairly swiftly, 
they got drawn into a prolonged and challenging nation building pro-
cess afterwards, where insurgents relentlessly attacked their troops 
and tried to hamper their reconstruction efforts. In the ensuing coun-
ter-insurgency warfare, the US deployed its interim brigade combat 
teams8, and the Stryker and especially the Kongsberg weapon station 
proved to be well suited to these operations, providing the right type 
of protection and firepower to counter hit-and-run attacks in populated 
areas. This experience led the US armed forces not only to place or-
ders for more Strykers with Kongsberg weapon stations, but also to 
award Kongsberg contracts for installing weapon station on other 
types of military vehicles (Gourley, 2006). The ensuing spike in de-
mand also ensured Norway a high level of exports, as the delivery 
schedule demanded that all available production capacity had to be 
used and trade barriers, such as the “Buy American Act”, had to be 
more leniently enforced.9 
 
                                                 
7  More precisely, it awarded the contract to a joint venture between General Motors De-
fense and General Dynamics Land Systems, but General Dynamics would later acquire 
General Motors Defense. 
8  These units were at that time referred to as Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and the first 
of these teams were deployed in Mosul, Iraq in 2003. 
9  Nevertheless, this leniency seems to have been a temporary measure, as Kongsberg and 
its sub-contractors have been encouraged to build production facilities in the US for the 
production of future weapon stations.  
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5.2 Medium and large caliber ammunition  
Medium and large caliber ammunition is a product category which is 
usually described as ranging from 12.7 mm rounds for heavy machine 
guns up to 155 mm shells for artillery cannons. Medium and large cal-
iber ammunition differs from its small caliber counterparts not only in 
size, but also in underlying technology. The increased dimensions al-
low for an inclusion of among others mechanical devices and energet-
ic compounds in the projectile that provides this type of ammunition 
with a broader range of capabilities. And it is common to divide this 
type of ammunition into categories based on the compounds they car-
ry or the effect they produce – such as armor-piercing, high explosive 
and incendiary ammunition. Although medium and large caliber am-
munition is a broad category, the Norwegian export success stems 
from three fairly specialized products produced by Nammo Raufoss – 
12.7 mm MP (multi-purpose) ammunition (for heavy machine guns 
and specialized sniper rifles), 30 mm MP ammunition (for the main 
cannon of armored personnel carriers) and M72 LAW (light anti-tank 
weapon) (which is a portable, shoulder fired, recoilless rifle10).  
 
The 12.7 mm and 30 mm MP ammunition were not developed as iso-
lated projects (Strandli, 2010). Rather they emerged from a larger 
multi-purpose concept that was conceived at Raufoss during the 
1960s. The concept was discovered in two steps and the first was tak-
en in the mid-1960s, when Raufoss was asked by the Norwegian 
armed forces to evaluate ammunition for their F-5 fighter-bomber. At 
that time, one of the scenarios that policy makers feared was that the 
Soviet Union would use Russian trawler boats, which were frequently 
observed outside the Norwegian cost, to disguise an invasion force. 
Raufoss therefore carry out tests of two proposed types of ammunition 
against a model of a trawler shipside – armor-piercing incendiary 
which they concluded would only penetrate the vessel without doing 
much damage and high explosive incendiary, which would explode 
outside the vessel and leave only a small bulge in the shipside. Never-
theless, the technicians of Raufoss also tried some practice rounds 
against the model, and they found that this ammunition would disinte-
grate as it penetrated the shipside and bring along a swarm of frag-
ments into the vessel – a highly desirable effect. The result was that 
Raufoss developed a modified “training-ammunition” filled with in-
cendiary charges that the air force adopted for its fighter-bombers.  
 
The second step was taken in the late 1960s, when Raufoss was de-
veloping the same type of incendiary ammunition for use in the Ar-
                                                 
10  M72 is sometimes called a “bazooka”, rocket propelled grenade or rocket launcher as the 
purpose and looks of the weapons are quite similar. Nevertheless, this is not completely 
correct, since the M72 fires a projectile and not a rocket. 
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my’s air-defence cannons (Strandli, 201011). On request from the Ar-
my, Raufoss had included a self-destruct charge in the projectiles to 
ensure that they did not fall down and cause damage in friendly terri-
tory. But when the technicians from Raufoss tested the new ammuni-
tion, an explosive effect appeared in the target as the incendiary com-
pounds set off the self-destruct charge – an effect that according to 
conventional physics should have been impossible.12 Raufoss would 
later find that the explosive effect appeared because incendiary com-
pounds caused a violent deflagration (combustion) of the self-destruct 
charge. Regardless, Raufoss was now in possession of a unique type 
of ammunition that had penetration, fragmentation, incendiary and 
blast effects. Since this implied that the ammunition could be used 
against a wide range of targets, Raufoss named the ammunition multi-
purpose (MP). Raufoss would nevertheless spend most of the 1970s – 
in close cooperation with the Norwegian Defence Research Estab-
lishment (FFI) – to understand the mechanisms underlying the ammu-
nition’s effects and to qualify a wide range of multi-purpose ammuni-
tion – including 12.7 mm and 30 mm MP. Raufoss also made im-
provements to this ammunition during the following decades, but 
mostly minor, incremental innovations to make the MP ammunition 
more stable.  
 
The M72 light antitank weapon has had an equally long, but perhaps 
somewhat less striking development story than the multi-purpose am-
munition. The M72 was initially developed in the US by the company 
Norris Thermadore and came to Norway as part of a Nato coordinated 
program in the mid-1960s, where Raufoss was named “prime contrac-
tor”. Raufoss kept improving the weapon further throughout the fol-
lowing decades, through the development of training ammunition and 
a series of incremental innovations to the launcher and projectile. Alt-
hough, Raufoss experienced a relatively stable demand for the M72 
throughout the 1970s, 80s and early 90s (Wang, 1996), the M72 re-
mained a “light” anti-tank weapon, and some military branches – such 
as the US Army which switched to the Swedish AT4 in the 1980s  – 
considered its penetration ability and range to be insufficient to cover 
their needs. Some of the M72’s main selling points have throughout 
most of its history remained light weight and low costs. 
 
The conditions that led to an increased demand for the M72 and 12.7 
mm and 30 mm MP seem to be quite similar to that of Kongsberg’s 
weapons station. The asymmetric threats experienced in Iraq and Af-
                                                 
11  The most detailed and comprehensive account that the authors have found on the devel-
opment of this ammunition was given in a speech held by Kåre Strandli in Ålesund, 15th 
of June, 2010. Strandli is considered to be the father of the multi-purpose concept and this 
description relies on a manuscript from this speech in its account for the development of 
this ammunition.  
12 To create an explosive effect you usually need a detonator and there was no detonator in 
the MP ammunition. 
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ghanistan led not only to new demands, but also to changes in the per-
ception of the different trade-offs between performance parameters in 
the weapon systems. An illustrating example of this was that several 
of the branches within the American armed forces – which had previ-
ously considered the M72 “to be too light” – found that the M72 was 
more than adequate in Afghanistan and Iraq where few of the targets 
were heavily armored. In addition, they found that the M72’s low 
weight and limited size allowed their soldiers to maneuver through 
Iraqi alleyways more easily, and its low back blast enabled them to 
fire from enclosed spaces without exposing themselves to hostile fire 
(Defence Industry Daily, 2005). The 12.7 mm MP also seemed well 
adapted to the urban warfare in Iraq and the mountain warfare in Af-
ghanistan, as its penetration ability enabled soldiers to take out ene-
mies hiding behind brick walls and its explosive and incendiary ef-
fects, to set technicals ablaze (Pick-up trucks with a mounted ma-
chine-gun). In addition the MP ammunition’s explosive and incendi-
ary effects have been reported to have had a demoralizing effect (psy-
chological) effect. All of these reasons seem to have led to an in-
creased demand for the M72 and 12.7 mm and 30 mm MP among 
several of the countries operating in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
5.3 Electronics 
Military electronics is a product category that is almost as wide-
ranging as civilian electronics. It includes everything from underwater 
sonar to space-based satellites, from small microchips to large-scale 
surveillance systems. Compared to this spectrum of diverse electron-
ics products, the Norwegian defence contractors operate within a cou-
ple of narrow niches. Nevertheless, electronics is still the segment of 
the Norwegian defence industry where companies produce the most 
varied set of military products, including a wide range of encryption 
solutions, tactical communications systems, night vision equipment, 
and electronic sensors such as radars, lasers and sonars. It is also the 
segment of the Norwegian defence industry comprised by the most 
varied group of companies, including one large multi-product firm, 
Kongsberg, and a couple of specialized, small and medium-sized 
companies such as Thales Norway, Simrad Optronics, Kitron and 
Saab technologies.  
 
Although the statistics show (see figure 1) a steep increase in the ex-
port of defense electronics during the 2000s, the electronics compa-
nies themselves emphasized during the interviews that they had expe-
rienced a strong, but fairly stable demand during this decade. They 
pointed out that the spike in export at the end of this decade should be 
attributed to natural fluctuations in the defense markets and the meth-
ods that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used to collect the data, rather 
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than any significant increase in demand13. Nevertheless, the defense 
electronics companies were keen to point out that the 2000s had been 
a very financially rewarding decade, and they attributed this success to 
factors such as their ability to focus on core competencies, the close 
cooperation with the Norwegian Defence Research Esptablishment 
(FFI), and exploiting comparative advantages.  
 
Figure 1: Norwegian export of electronics products and  
equipment, 2003-2009. 
 
 
 
Source: statistics from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
The first success factors that all of the interviewed defence electronics 
companies emphasized was their ability to focus on niche products 
and core competencies. Nevertheless, these defence electronics com-
panies had a somewhat diverse understanding of what this focus on 
niche products and core competencies actually implies. Some of the 
firms maintained that their success abroad could in large parts be at-
tributed to building core competencies by taking on the job as “sys-
tems integrators” for a large and complex defense electronics system 
at home. One of these companies explained that the role as systems 
integrator provided insights that allowed them to better “spec” (speci-
fy) their product to meet the needs of foreign clients, and another 
company maintained that acting as systems integrator at home enabled 
them to “productify” the best parts of the system and sell it as compo-
nents abroad. Other companies had yet another interpretation of what 
a focus on core competencies meant and put the emphasis on produc-
                                                 
13  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs collects data on the physical flow of goods rather than 
financial transactions. This implies that the companies could have received payment both 
in advance and later than they actually shipped the defence equipment. 
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ing a small number of products and selling them to a limited set of cli-
ents. One of these enterprises acknowledged that there was considera-
ble civilian demand for its products, but said that it had chosen to limit 
its supply to the military market because it believed that catering to 
civilian clients might lead to a loss of focus on military requirements.  
 
The second main success factor that the defence electronics compa-
nies emphasized was the close cooperation with the public research 
organization FFI (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment). Sev-
eral of the defence electronics companies mentioned that they had col-
laborated with FFI on defence electronics projects over several dec-
ades and that the success that they experienced during the 2000s could 
in large parts be attributed to the technological innovations and in-
sights that these projects had generated. The important role that FFI 
has played in Norwegian defence electronics has also been highlighted 
by historians such as Ørstavik (1994), Njølstad and Wicken (1997). 
These argued that FFI established itself as the leading Norwegian cen-
ter for electronics research in the first decades after World War II and 
that it played a pivotal role in establishing a defence electronics indus-
try in the country, by involving Norwegian companies in commercial-
izing technologies that it had developed, such as asdisc (sonar) and 
wireless communications solutions. Although not all of these products 
became huge commercial successes, the initiatives fostered a strong 
and lasting relationship between FFI and several of the defence elec-
tronics firms, and it is this relationship that, according to the compa-
nies themselves, gave them a competitive edge in the 2000s. 
 
A third success factor that emerged during the interviews was the abil-
ity to exploit comparative advantages. Several of the firms said that 
their success in the foreign markets in large parts was due to focusing 
on product niches where geography and history had provided Norwe-
gians with a competitive edge. One of the defence electronics compa-
nies explained that building tactical communications solutions in 
Norway was especially challenging, since these communications sys-
tems had to function over long distances, across deep valleys and high 
mountains, and under rough weather conditions. These challenges had 
forced them to develop tactical communication solutions that could 
operate under extremely demanding circumstances, and that again had 
provided them with a competitive edge in Middle Eastern markets, 
where the customers needed communication systems that could oper-
ate during desert storms. In a similar way, the same company also ex-
plained that designing oil installations for operations at the bottom of 
the North Sea and developing navigations solutions for maneuvering 
along a treacherous shoreline, had helped them build better combat 
management systems for submarines and surface vessels. Lastly, one 
of the defence electronics companies also emphasized “cultural com-
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petencies” as another Norwegian comparative advantage. According 
to this argument, Norway is a small open economy that relies on ex-
tensive trade with other countries, and has therefore developed an 
acute awareness of other countries culture and needs. These cultural 
competencies had according to this company helped them gain con-
tracts by better specifying their products to their customer’s needs and 
giving a better impression of their company by behaving according to 
their clients’ customs. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and policy  
implications 
The paper has carried out an empirical analysis of the main factors 
explaining the export performance of firms in the defence sector in 
Norway. After a presentation of our theoretical framework and hy-
potheses (section 2) and the data and methodology (section 3), the pa-
per has presented the results of two complementary analyses. The first 
is based on quantitative firm-level data for the whole population of 
defence companies in Norway, and limited to the recent period 2006-
2009 (section 4); the second is based on qualitative case study re-
search on the three most important defence export product types 
(weapon stations, ammunition, electronics), and how these have 
emerged historically and come to dominate the export markets in the 
last few years. The key results of the paper and the main implications 
for policy can be summarized under the following four points. 
 
First, public regulations and policy interventions in the defence indus-
try are as well-known extensive, and they do play an important role to 
foster the export performance of domestic firms in foreign markets. 
Specifically, both the quantitative firm-level analysis and the descrip-
tion of the three case studies indicate that offset agreements have had 
a clear role to overcome entry barriers and facilitate the initial penetra-
tion of Norwegian defence firms in international markets. However, as 
stated in the introduction of the article, the new EU Directive that is 
now starting to be implemented by EU members (and Norway) will 
gradually seek to introduce a greater degree of market liberalization 
and progressively limit the number and extent of offset agreements 
that national authorities will be allowed to stipulate (Edwards, 2011). 
This implies that, in a long time horizon, defence enterprises will have 
to rely less and less on this type of instruments of national protection, 
and progressively base their international competitiveness solely on 
their own capabilities, competencies and strategies. 
 
This calls the attention to our second result. A summary description of 
Norwegian defence firms’ competencies and strategies leads to point 
out two distinct market trajectories. On the one hand, only a few large 
oligopolistic enterprises (e.g. Kongsberg and Nammo) have been able 
to maintain their dominant position for a long time and eventually 
configure themselves as internationally competitive system integrators 
and global players in a number of different areas (see the description 
of the first and the second case studies). This type of trajectory largely 
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resembles what the recent international economics literature identifies 
as superstar exporters, i.e. large firms that due to their greater size, 
productivity and capital intensity, are able to overcome trade barriers 
and export in several different foreign markets. On the other hand, 
however, a distinct trajectory is traced by a bunch of SMEs that, de-
spite their relatively smaller size and more narrow competence and 
product portfolio, have been able to achieve a solid international posi-
tion by providing specialized equipment and precision instruments to 
large defence manufacturers in foreign countries – as discussed in the 
third case focusing on the export of defence electronics (e.g. the com-
panies Thales Norway and Simrad Optronics). This second typology 
closely corresponds to what Pavitt (1984) defined as specialized sup-
pliers firms. The Norwegian export patterns suggest that these, by 
achieving a high degree of specialization in a narrow range of industry 
segments, may turn out to have an important role to foster small coun-
tries’ participation in the global value chain. All in all, according to 
our empirical research, the key success factor that is common to both 
trajectories is not firm size per se but rather the set of core competen-
cies that characterize each company. Thus, policy measures aimed at 
strengthening Norwegian firms’ international competitiveness should 
not only focus on the restricted core of large exporters but also intro-
duce schemes to support further the foreign market penetration of 
smaller specialized suppliers. 
 
Thirdly, in such a highly sophisticated technological environment as 
the defence industry, firms’ core competencies are closely interwined 
with and strongly dependent on their technological capacity and inno-
vative activities. Our empirical analysis has kept this aspect under 
close scrutiny. On the one hand, both the regression and the case study 
results have highlighted the important role of the public S&T system 
as a key cooperation partner for innovative firms in the Norwegian 
defence sector – see in particular the key role played by the public re-
search organization FFI for the initial development of all three prod-
ucts analyzed in our case studies. On the other hand, we have also fo-
cused on R&D intensity as a possibly important factor explaining 
firms’ export performance. Our regression results, though, fail to iden-
tify any statistically significant correlation between the two variables. 
The case studies did however shed further light on this result (or lack 
of such). In the defence industry, the lag between an R&D project and 
the phase of market (and foreign market) commercialization is typical-
ly quite long, so that it is difficult to measure this relationship within 
the context of a relatively short time span and dataset. The first and 
second of our case studies – on weapon systems and ammunition – do 
in fact indicate that the technologies underpinning these successful 
export products had in all cases been introduced several years (or even 
decades) before these became popular items in international defence 
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markets. An implication for policy making here is that R&D projects – 
and particularly those funded by national agents through public pro-
curement – should to the extent possible take into due account demand 
opportunities in overseas markets and their possible future prospects, 
since the export success of any new R&D project is highly dependent 
on the match between the technological and product characteristics, on 
the one hand, and market demand opportunities, on the other. 
 
The importance of demand opportunities and changing demand condi-
tions leads to our fourth main conclusion. The defence market is typi-
cally characterized by fluctuating demand where one or few big, often 
public, customers are responsible for a large share of contracts. And 
since these large customers are highly dependent on political condi-
tions and exogenous shocks, market demand is often characterized by 
strong uncertainty and volatility. Specifically, in the Norwegian case, 
an overly important factor to explain the recent export success for 
weapon systems and ammunition is the increased market opportunities 
that have been created in the last decade by international political de-
velopments and new military requirements determined by the conflicts 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although these political developments and 
the related changing demand conditions are to a large extent difficult 
to predict, an important factor that may partly alleviate this problem is 
user-producer interactions, which is another crucial variable highlight-
ed in our paper. In fact, our results show that Norwegian defence firms 
regard advanced users in foreign markets as an important cooperation 
partner to commercialize their products overseas. To the extent that 
well developed and long lasting collaborations between domestic and 
foreign producers contribute to decrease transaction costs and lower 
entry barriers in international markets, international collaborative pro-
jects and joint ventures may represent an important strategy for firms 
to achieve a greater degree of certainty and predictability about future 
demand conditions and share the related risks with their international 
partners. This type of collaborative schemes does therefore represent a 
potentially relevant policy measure to foster defence firms’ efficiency 
and international activities. 
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